There is a duality theory connecting certain stochastic orderings between cumulative distribution functions F 1 , F 2 and stochastic orderings between their inverses F −1
Introduction
Many results in mathematical utility theory and in the parallel theories of poverty can be cast in terms of stochastic orderings; a standard reference is Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) . Moreover, it is becoming clear from work in these areas that there is a duality between orderings based on income distributions expressed via the cumulative income distribution (cdf) F and certain orderings on the quantile function F −1 ; see, in particular, Yaari (1987) . Such matters are also of growing interest in financial and insurance risk areas. A useful text is Müller and Stoyan (2002) . An example of the duality is that between second order stochastic dominance (SSD) and so-called weak Lorenz ordering:
2 dt for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
(1) This result has been studied in important contributions by Muliere and Scarsini (1999) and Ogryczak and Ruszczynski (2002) , who show the link to Fenchel duality. The book by Pallaschke and Rolewicz (1997) covers relevant generalisations of Fenchel duality. Sordo and Ramos (2007) cover similar ground with a discussion of the literature, going back to Lorenz (1905) . A generalisation of (1) is at the heart of this paper.
There is also an equivalence between orderings and their characterizations in terms of a set of order preserving functions, expected utilities in the language of economics. Thus, first order stochastic dominance defined as F 1 (x) ≥ F 2 (x) for all x, holds if and only if
where X ∼ F 1 and Y ∼ F 2 , for all non-decreasing u(·). For second order stochastic dominance (SSD) the equivalence is for all non-decreasing concave u(·) for which expectations exist. There is a utility theory associated with F −1 which is often referred to as the dual theory of rank-dependent utilities, and studies concepts such as "deprivation indexes": see Atkinson (1970) , Sen (1973) , Cowell (1977) . For the moment we simply note that these dual utilities measure the rank position of an individual (in terms of income) in the population, as opposed to the actual level of income. There are a variety of duality theorems relating the utility theories based on F and F −1 . Recent examples are Maccheroni, Muliere and Zoli (2005) and Chateauneuf and Moyes (2005) .
A rich and related area is the study of "distortions" on a cumulative distribution function F . It is fundamental to our approach that there are two types of distortion and that they can be applied to F or to F −1 . One type takes the form of a direct transformation of the cdf: v(F ), for some function v(·). The other type is applied to the base measure so that, for an integrable function g(·), g(t)dt becomes g(t)du(t). For F −1 we have analogous distortions. Distortions have been studied in Prospect Theory using terminology such as "probability weighting", see Tversky (1979), (1992) .
It is a main aim of the paper to present a general type of stochastic ordering which helps to unify the above theories. This is done via our main duality theorem, Theorem 1 in Section 3. The proof, in Appendix 1, uses the promised generalisation of (1), Lemma 1, which incorporates distortions of both types just mentioned, applied both to F and, swapped over, to F −1 . Furthermore, each side of the duality has an equivalent representation in terms of utility functions which, perhaps surprisingly, uses the same class of functions as are used for the distortion. This means that Theorem 1 has four equivalent parts. Our stochastic ordering is defined given two base (distortion) functions u 0 and v 0 . The duality involving F and F −1 and the utility versions are then fixed. The proofs are somewhat technical because we assume general cdf's. Appropriate forms of some standard results are needed, such as integration by parts, and these are put into Appendix 2.
The test of a theory may be the range of its special cases. In Section 6 we cover such cases and also issues such as dominated risk aversion and inequality aversion.
Orderings and duality
We start with a general definition which involves a simultaneous distortion of the cdf's and the measure. Let U, V be classes of functions u, v, where u : R → R and v : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. All such functions will be of bounded variation, so that we can take the associated measures. The notation f (x)du(x) and g(α)dv(α) will be used for the Lebesgue-Stieltjes integrals, but when the integrating variable is clear, it will be shortened to f (x)du and g(α)dv. Throughout the paper it will be understood that when u or v is right continuous the associated Stieltjes integral will be extended to half-open intervals inclusive of the upper end-point, whereas if the function is left continuous the Stieltjes integral will be extended to intervals half-open to the right.
Definition 1 Let U, V be classes of functions u, v and let F 1 , F 2 be two cdf 's. We say that F 1 is less than
for all u ∈ U, v ∈ V for which the integrals exist.
This paper is also concerned with dual orderings which take the form given by the following definition. For a cdf F we define F −1 in the usual way:
and, following the standard, take F to be right continuous so that F −1 is left continuous.
Definition 2 LetŨ,Ṽ be classes of functionsũ,ṽ and let F 1 , F 2 be two cdf 's. We say that F 1 is less than F 2 in the dual (Ũ,Ṽ )-ordering if
for allũ inŨ andṽ inṼ .
A duality theorem in the context of Definitions 1 and 2 is a collection {U, V,Ũ,Ṽ } such that the (U, V )-ordering and the dual (Ũ ,Ṽ )-ordering are mathematically equivalent. A well-known example is for the ordinary (first order) stochastic dominance
Importantly, using integration by parts under suitable conditions, each of the inequalities in Definitions 1 and 2 may have an equivalent version in terms of expected utility. In that case the (U, V )-ordering is equivalent to the statement
for all u in U and v in V . The dual (Ũ,Ṽ )-ordering is equivalent to
for all u inŨ and v inṼ . It would not be too presumptuous to say that the majority of stochastic orderings defined in the literature (see the list at the end of Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007) are of the form (2), (3), (4) or (5). An equivalence theorem of the type mentioned above would state that under suitable conditions (2), (3), (4) and (5) are equivalent. In (4) and (5) the functions u(x) andṽ(x), respectively, can be considered as utility functions, so that as we move to the dual versions, that is from (4) to (5) , the roles of the distortions are reversed. This discussion should explain roughly why our main result, Theorem 1, has four main parts.
3 The upper (u 0 , v 0 )-ordering and a duality theorem
We start with two functions, u 0 , v 0 which define our basic stochastic ordering, following a few definitions. Throughout the paper "increasing" will mean non-decreasing (unless otherwise stated), and similarly for "decreasing". All functions will be of bounded variation on compact intervals and integration is Lebesgue-Stieltjes. Unless otherwise stated, when we integrate with respect to a measure defined by a right continuous function the integral will be extended to intervals of the form (a,b] , and when with respect to a left continuous function to intervals [a,b) . 
for some bounded decreasingk on [0, 1].
We can interpret Definition 4 as saying that k(x) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of u with respect to u 0 k(x) = du du 0 and is decreasing; similarly for v and v 0 .
If we add the condition that u 0 and u are increasing (see Definition 3), we have that
decreasing, which in turn, if the functions are twice differentiable and the second derivatives non-zero, is equivalent to
is the measure of absolute risk aversion. By the Arrow-Pratt Theorem, (Arrow, 1974; Pratt, 1964) , u and u 0 satisfy (6) if and only if u(x) = φ(u 0 (x)) for some concave increasing function φ.
There are similarly versions of (6) and (7) for the v 0 -concave functions of Definition 4. We can also define u 0 -and v 0 -convex functions which will be discussed in Section 3.
The stochastic ordering we introduce in this paper is a special example of the (U, V )-ordering discussed above.
Definition 5 Given two cdf 's F 1 and F 2 and a standard pair (u 0 , v 0 ), according to Definition 3 we define the upper
for all u in U 0 , the class of u 0 -concave increasing functions.
The main result of the paper is the next theorem which is an example of a duality referred to above. As presaged it says first that F 1 ≺ (u 0 ,v 0 ) F 2 is equivalent to an ordering, involving F −1 1 and F −1 2 , in which the roles of u 0 and v 0 are reversed and secondly that there are equivalent utility versions, again using u 0 and v 0 in reverse "distortion" roles.
Theorem 1 Let u 0 , v 0 be a standard pair and U 0 and V 0 the u 0 -concave v 0 -concave increasing classes, respectively. Let F 1 and F 2 be cdf 's which satisfy the following conditions
Then the following are equivalent:
There are also four more equivalent statements which are obtained by transformation of variables in (i)−(iv). For example (i) * is obtained form (i) by a transformation α = F (x) (see (42), Section 9.2 of Appendix 2) and we then obtain a formula with the same structure as (iv) but with the zero suffix moved from u 0 to v; similarly for (ii)
The Proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix 1. At the centre of the proof is the following "double distortion" version of statement (1), also proved in Appendix 1.
Lemma 1 Let (u 0 , v 0 ) be a standard pair and let F 1 , F 2 be two cdf 's on R satisfying the condition (a), above, then the following are equivalent:
We show that statements (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1 are equivalent to statements (i) and (ii), respectively, of Theorem 1. Note that Theorem 1 shows that the upper (u 0 , v 0 )-ordering is equivalent to two inequalities for the "expected utilities" under the distortion, namely:
, and also:
where
A convex version
A review of the stochastic orderings literature points to several results in which convex increasing functions are used combined with the survivor function
The authors pondered as to whether there are two rather separate theories or whether the duality theory of Section 2 can be applied without too much additional labour to obtain a convex version. We believe that indeed the latter is the case and this section develops such a result. First, we need to define u 0 -convexity.
where m(·) is increasing on R. Similarly for v 0 -convex functions using an increasing
We start with a preamble giving transforms which yield a convex version of Theorem 1.
If X ∼ F (x) is a random variable, then the cdf of −X is
and its inverse cdf is
Also, for any standard pair (u 0 , v 0 ) definẽ
and note that (ũ 0 ,ṽ 0 ) is still a standard pair.
Next, select one of the expressions used in Lemma 1, e.g.
and replace u 0 (x) byũ 0 (x), v 0 (x) byṽ 0 (x) and F (x) by F −X (x). Making the transformation z = −x, we have
These calculations lead naturally to the following definition.
Definition 7 For cdf 's F 1 and F 2 and standard pair
for all increasing u 0 -convex functions u.
The convex version of Theorem 1 is obtained by applyingũ 0 ,ṽ 0 , F −X 1 and F −X 2 throughout and then converting back to statements about u 0 , v 0 , F 1 and F 2 and using (8) and (9). It should be added that after this conversion condition (a) from Theorem 1 remains the same, but (b) changes to (b) ′ below. A compact way of summarizing the analysis is to say that it is a development of the statement
This could be taken as an equivalent definition.
Theorem 2 Let (u 0 , v 0 ) be a standard pair and U 0 and V 0 the u 0 -, v 0 -convex increasing classes, respectively. Let F 1 and F 2 be cdf 's which satisfy condition (a) of Theorem 1 together with
Important aspects of Theorem 2 are that u 0 -concave and v 0 -concave are replaced respectively by u 0 -convex and v 0 -convex and that the utility version for v(α), namely (iv), has as similar structure to v 0 (α) in Definition 7. The new condition, (b) ′ , controls the existence of the integrals as x → ∞ and uses a distortion generalisation of the survivor function: 1 − v 0 (F (x) ). This requires that u(x) does not increase too fast as x → ∞. This is to be compared to (b) of Theorem 1 which says that u(x) should not decrease too fast as x → −∞. ′ , in those theorems, all hold. First, let us impose no condition on u 0 except bounded variation. Then any such u 0 -concave function u(x) can be represented as
where u 1 (x) is u 0 -concave increasing and −u 2 (x) = u 3 (x) is u 0 -convex increasing. This is established by breaking k(x) (see Definition 4) into non-negative and nonpositive parts:
Then if we have inequalities involving integrals du 1 and reverse inequalities involving du 3 , with the same integrand, we can achieve bounds with no extra conditions on u 0 . 
Motivated by the above discussion we have 
for all u 0 -concave functions u (not necessarily increasing).
Proof. To establish the inequality in the Lemma we add the inequalities in definitions of upper and lower orderings which, because of the reversals, are in the right direction.
It is important too that assuming both (b) and (b) ′ gives the existence of the relevant integrals. To establish the converse we can make k + (x) and k − (x) in the construction alternatively zero.
Drawing on similar arguments to those for Theorems 1 and 2 we can establish the following. ′ from Theorems 1 and 2 hold; then the following are equivalent 
for all increasing concave u(·) for which the integrals exist. Condition (a) of Theorem 1 means the existence of the expected values E(X), E(Y ), where X ∼ F 1 and Y ∼ F 2 . In this case some of the equivalent statements of Theorems 1, 2 and 3 are well-known, but others are not easily found in the literature. Theorem 1 states that (13) is equivalent to
for all increasing concave u(·). This is known as the increasing concave ordering: Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007) . For continuous cdf's the equivalence of (13) and (14) is well-known.
, and u x (z) = x otherwise, for all x ∈ R, (13) is equivalent to
This is the Second Order Stochastic Dominance (F 1 ≤ SSD F 2 ) ordering. The equivalence of ≤ SSD and ≤ icv is also well-known, see Muller and Stoyan (2002) . Further, by Theorem 1, (13) is also equivalent to
for all increasing concave v(·), and also to
for all increasing concave v(·). This equivalence seems to be new.
which is a generalization of the Lorenz ordering. The equivalence of (18) and ≤ icv can be found in several papers, at least for special cases. Recently Sordo and Ramos (2007) have proved it under general conditions.
With u 0 and v 0 the identity, the lower (u 0 , v 0 )-ordering F 1 ≤ (u 0 ,v 0 ) F 2 can be expressed as:
for all increasing convex u(·), where
is equivalent to
for all increasing convex u(·). This is known as the increasing convex (≤ icx ) ordering. It is also equivalent to 
and the equivalence of ≤ icx and (22) 
Majorization
Majorization is an ordering ≺ of real vectors which satisfies the Dalton-Pigou Principle of Transfers of wealth and was brought to the fore by Marshall and Olkin's (1979) fundamental book. Given the vectors x = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n ) let x (1) ≥ x (2) ≥ ... ≥ x (n) and y (1) ≥ y (2) ≥ ... ≥ y (n) be the rearranged coordinates; one of several equivalent definitions of y ≺ x is
Removing the "equal means" condition (bottom line) defines two extensions of this ordering, that are perhaps less well known: lower weak majorization y ≺ w x :
and upper weak majorization y ≺ w x n i=n−k
Our theory gives results well known or easily derived directly. Let X and Y be random variables on finite supports on the line, such that Pr(X = x i ) = Pr(Y = y i ) = 1/n for all i. The upper (u 0 , v 0 )-ordering F 1 ≺ (u 0 ,v 0 ) F 2 with u 0 the identity and v 0 the identity is upper weak majorization y ≺ w x (in the reverse ordering of the vectors). By Lemma 1,
2 (α)dα for all 0 < p ≤ 1, which is precisely (23). An increasing concave function u(x) yields positive decreasing increments u(x (n−i+1) ) − u(x (n−i) ) and u(y (n−i+1) ) − u(y (n−i) ) for i = 1, ..., n − 1. Similarly v increasing concave means that the increments
) yield a positive decreasing sequence, and the equivalent statements (i) to (iv) in Theorem 1 can be translated into equivalent statements (24) to (27) below. Equivalence with (24) to (26) can be found in Marshall and Olkin (1979) whereas (27) can be easily obtained from the definition (i)
for any increasing concave real function u(·);
for any decreasing sequence 1
for all increasing concave real functions u(·);
for all increasing concave real functions v(·), where x (0) = y (0) = K is any real number.
Similarly, for uniform distributions with finite supports on the real line, the lower (u 0 , v 0 )-ordering F 1 ≺ (u 0 ,v 0 ) F 2 when u 0 and v 0 are the identity becomes x ≺ w y and the equivalence of (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 2 gives equivalent statements in the theory of lower weak majorization.
It is well known that standard majorization x ≺ y holds iff x ≺ w y and x ≺ w y. Thus x ≺ y is a special case of the double ordering of Theorem 3 with u 0 , v 0 both the identity.
It may be interesting to consider extensions when u 0 is a different increasing function. For instance, u 0 (x) = log x yields the ordering known as log-majorization (including the weak versions). Theorems 1, 2 and 3 in this case provide non-trivial new results.
Social welfare functionals
The risk functional (x) is the main mathematical entity of Expected Utility (EU) theory and the theory of decision-making under risk. There is a close formal relationship between that literature and the literature on income distribution. From a mathematical point of view it is clear there is an extensive duality theory between the "forward" theory of utility, and the reverse theory, the theory of welfare. We mention a few implications of our results for these theories. On the side of the welfare literature are the so-called "rank-dependent social welfare functionals" and the related rank-dependent expected utility theory (RDEU). This goes back to Quiggin (1982) who developed the RDEU model based on
where f 0 : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a strictly increasing and continuous distortion function, called a "perception", for which f 0 (0) = 0 and f 0 (1) = 1 and u 0 is a strictly increasing utility. When f 0 is the identity function the RDEU theory reduces to EU. With the Gini index as a prominent exception, the most common inequality measures can be interpreted in a social welfare framework formally equivalent to the EU model. When u 0 is the identity, the RDEU model yields the Yaari welfare function
The most popular social welfare function of the form W (F ) is the S-Gini function, where f 0 (p) = p ρ with ρ > 1 (Donaldson and Weymark, 1980; Yitzhaki, 1983) . Note that the classical Gini index is associated to the S-Gini social welfare function with ρ = 2. The parameter ρ can be seen as a measure of inequality aversion. Note that (29) can be rewritten as
whereF (x) = 1 − F (x) and v 0 (α) = 1 − f 0 (1 − α), so that 0 ≤ v 0 (α) ≤ 1, and v 0 is increasing. Increasing v 0 -concave functions are all the increasing f 0 -convex ones. A simple change of variables yields a different expression for Yaari's functional:
We now state two simple corollaries of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1
If u 0 is the identity and f 0 an increasing function, under the assumptions of Theorem 1 the following two statements are equivalent:
, for all u increasing and concave (S 1 )
The first of these statements say that F 2 is preferred to F 1 , in the expected utility sense, by all risk-averse decision-makers with "perception" defined by f 0 . The second says that F 2 is preferred to F 1 , in the Yaari sense, by decision-makers whose inequality aversion is greater than f 0 .
The equivalence of (S 1 ) and (S 2 ) can be extended, as a consequence of the following corollary.
Corollary 2
Take u 0 and f 0 to be increasing functions. When the assumptions of Theorem 1 are satisfied, the following two statements are equivalent:
, for all u increasing and u 0 -concave,
Inequality (S 3 ) expresses the preference of F 2 over F 1 in a utility sense, for all decision-makers with a given perception f 0 whose risk aversion is greater than u 0 ; inequality (S 4 ) states the preference of F 2 over F 1 in a RDEU sense by all decisionmakers with utility u 0 and greater inequality aversion than f 0 . To the best of these authors' knowledge, the equivalence of (S 3 ) and (S 4 ) does not appear in the literature.
Discussion
Stochastic orderings are an attractive way of summarizing preferences between distributions such as in comparing portfolios, assessing risk in insurance, in individual decision-making and in the study of income distribution and welfare. Our starting point in Definition 1 is to stress the use of partial orderings, that is group preferences, via the (U, V )-formulation.
Our version of this integral stochastic ordering, in Definition 5, captures the preference not simply of a single subject but those of a group of subjects each with a private utility and each at least as risk averse as a base subject represented by u 0 . The duality theory says that this group defines a dual group described by utilities attached to the quantile function, with its own base utility v 0 . Members of this dual group are at least as risk averse as the base subject in the dual realm. Moreover, the utility function for the base subject in the first group provides a (probability) distortion in the dual theory and vice versa.
8 Appendix 1
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is in two stages. The first is to show that Lemma 1 holds at "crossing points" of F 1 and F 2 , the second is to extrapolate the result between crossing points.
Definition 9 For two cdf 's F
, for all x ∈ (a, b) In this case we say that "F 1 up-crosses F 2 ". If the roles of F 1 and F 2 are reversed we say that "F 1 down-crosses F 2 ".
2 . With care, we can make the crossing intervals match up: if x 0 is an up-crossing point of (
2 ) and similarly for the converse.
Lemma 3 If x 0 is a crossing point for the pair (F 1 , F 2 ), then
The same for a down-crossing value, changing the statements appropriately.
Proof. Change of variables is the key to the proof. Thus, by Lemma 4 in Appendix 2, and the discussion there, applied first to F 1 (x) and then to F 2 (x), we have
Let x 0 be an up-crossing point for the pair (F 1 , F 2 ) and let
For the purpose of proving the first implication in Lemma 3, we can assume, without loss of generality, that any crossing interval reduces to just a point, since open intervals on which F 1 (x) = F 2 (x) (part (iii) of Definition 9) only contribute by adding a constant to the left hand sides of the last identities. By the same argument, for all
2 (α) = x 0 , so without loss of generality we can assume, similarly, that
2 (p). Then the right hand sides of (32) and (33) become equal and the first implication in Lemma 3 is true for up-crossing. The proof for down-crossing points is similar. Furthermore, the proof of the converse is now straightforward.
The value of Lemma 3 is to highlight "good" points where it is straightforward to prove the equivalence in Lemma 1. It is a little more straightforward to prove the reverse implication (ii) ⇒ (i) in Lemma 1 first. Thus, assume that (ii) in Lemma 1 holds for all p. Then for any x 0 which belongs to a crossing interval the inequality (i) in Lemma 1 holds, as just shown. We now need to extend the proof essentially to the regions between crossing intervals.
Thus, suppose that for a given x 0 there is no p such that (x 0 , p) is a crossing pair. Let x 1 = sup{x ′ : such that x ′ < x 0 and x ′ is a crossing point} then x 1 belongs to a crossing interval and assume for all non-negative bounded σ-finite measures dµ(c) on R. Next, introducing the indicator function I (−∞,c) (x), reversing the integrals and using Fubini's Theorem, which holds because of the boundedness of dµ(c) and condition (a), we have
is a non-negative decreasing bounded function and we define u(x) so that k(x)du 0 = du. But such a u is precisely a u 0 -concave increasing function satisfying Definition 4. A similar argument applies to statement (ii) in Lemma 1 and we obtain the equivalent version. Thus, we have shown that (i) ⇔ (ii) in Theorem 1. Note that we use condition (a) to obtain Fubini in this case and a bounded decreasing functionk(α), α ∈ [0, 1], as in Definition 4.
Finally, that condition (iii) is equivalent to (i), and (ii) is equivalent to (iv) follows from the version of integration by parts in Section 6.1 of Appendix 2, the discussion therein and conditions (a) and (b) in Theorem 1. This is to obtain bounded integrals. This ends the proof of Theorem 1.
9 Appendix 2
Integration by parts
Because we use a nonstandard version of the "integration by parts" theorem, we include a full proof here. 
for each pair of real numbers a < b. The statement of the theorem is equivalent to the following (a,b] (
which is also equivalent to (a,b] (
We observe that
Adding up these two identities, we obtain
an equivalent statement to the assert of this theorem.
We first apply Theorem 4 taking (u 0 , v 0 ) to be a standard pair, and letting U(x) = u 0 (x) and V (x) = v 0 (F (x)). Then under condition (a) of Theorem 1 we obtain
Then we apply Theorem 4 again taking U(α) = u 0 (F −1 (α)) and V (α) = v 0 (α) and, again under condition (a) of Theorem 1, obtain
Change of variables
A classical mathematical result states.
Theorem 5 (Change of variables). Let (Ω, Ξ, µ) be a measure space and ϕ : Ω → R a measurable function. For any Borel set A consider the measure µϕ −1 (A) = µ(ϕ −1 (A)). Let f be measurable real function on the real line R. Then for all A
We apply this theorem to the sets A = (−∞, a] and the function ϕ(α) = F −1 (α) where F is a cdf so that Ω = (0, 1). Recall
hence
It is easy to see that ϕ u 0 (F −1 (α))dv 0 (α) for any given a ∈ R.
A very similar proof yields:
v 0 (F (x))du 0 (x) for any given p ∈ (0, 1] .
Clearly we can replace u 0 (·) by u(·) and v 0 (·) by v(·), and also let a → ∞ and p → 1, thus we have Proof. All integrals are bounded because of (a). We prove the first statement. Fix x 0 and consider the case α 0 = F (x 0 ). By change of variables in the second term and integration by parts To prove the second statement of the Lemma assume F (x − 1 ) ≤ α 1 ≤ F (x 1 ). Then F −1 (α 1 ) = F −1 (F (x 1 )) and the function u 0 (F −1 (α)) is constant for all α 1 ≤ α ≤ F (x 1 ). By the first part of the Lemma Statistics at the London School of Economics during a number of visits. Both authors would like to thank Irene Crimaldi for providing the elegant proof of Theorem 4, Claudio Zoli for useful conversations at an early stage of the work and two referees for helpful comments and additional references.
